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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 11-2422 
_______________ 
 
 
JOSEPH GREENAWALT, 
 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CLARION COUNTY 
 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-09-cv-01489) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gary L. Lancaster 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 23, 2012 
_______________ 
 
 
Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 30, 2012) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
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Joseph Greenawalt appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to his 
former employer, Clarion County, in his suit alleging unlawful employment 
discrimination on the basis of age and gender.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 
I. 
 Because we write solely for the parties, we set forth only those facts necessary to 
our decision.  Greenawalt worked as a corrections officer at the Clarion County Jail from 
November 2001, when he was hired at age 51, until August 2008, when he was 
terminated at age 58.  An investigation by the Deputy Warden in 2008 revealed that 
Greenawalt, using an alias to conceal his identity, had been covertly mailing ―gifts‖ of 
about $20 per week ($600 to $700 total) to a female inmate and depositing that money in 
her account at the Jail.  Clarion County Jail Administrative Policy A-106, which was in 
place at the time of Greenawalt’s employment, restricted the permissible nature of 
relationships between corrections officers and current and former inmates.  It specifically 
prohibited monetary gifts.  When confronted, Greenawalt admitted that he sent the money 
to the inmate under a false name and that his actions violated Policy A-106.  After an 
administrative hearing on the matter, Greenawalt was discharged. 
 Greenawalt then sued Clarion County, claiming that he was discharged on the 
basis of his age and gender in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e–2 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 951 et seq.  Although Greenawalt admitted he knowingly violated 
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Policy A-106, he claimed that he was treated less favorably than younger, mostly female, 
corrections officers who violated that same policy.   
Greenawalt pointed to four comparators.  Corrections Officer Bobbie Mangiantini 
married a former inmate.  She was also, according to some of her evaluations, too 
―inmate-friendly.‖  Among other things, she reportedly had a snowball fight and played a 
―foot game‖ with current inmates.  The County did not discharge Mangiantini nor did it 
ask her to resign.  Corrections Officer Holly Parrish was permitted to resign, and did so, 
after the County discovered that she had written a letter to a former inmate.  Corrections 
Officer April Johnston was given a oral warning for her involvement with a former 
inmate on Facebook.  Corrections Officer Brad Smith, according to Greenawalt, was also 
involved with a former inmate and not disciplined.   
The District Court granted Clarion County’s motion for summary judgment.  The 
Court determined that Greenawalt failed to establish a prima facie case of age or gender 
discrimination.  Specifically, he did not produce evidence that would give rise to an 
inference of discrimination because he did not show that he was treated differently than 
similarly situated individuals who were not members of his protected class.  Greenawalt’s 
suggested comparators, according to the Court, were not similarly situated to him.  It 
found that the circumstances surrounding their violations of Policy A-106 (relationships 
with former inmates) and the circumstances of his violation (covertly ―gifting‖ money to 
a current inmate) were sufficiently distinguishable such that it was reasonable for the 
County to treat their offenses differently.  In addition, the Court assumed that even if 
Greenawalt could establish a prima facie case, he offered insufficient evidence to suggest 
4 
 
that Clarion County’s non-discriminatory reason for his termination (his violation of 
Policy A-106) was merely pretext for unlawful discrimination.  The Court also rejected 
his mixed-motive and subordinate-bias theories.  Greenawalt appeals. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We review de novo a grant of summary judgment.  Regents of Mercerberg Coll. v. 
Republic Franklin Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2006).  Summary judgment is 
proper when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001).   
III. 
 Greenawalt offers three theories of discrimination — a pretext theory, a mixed-
motive theory, and a subordinate-bias (or ―cat’s paw‖) theory.  All three theories fail.  
 We analyze Greenawalt’s pretext theory under the familiar McDonnell Douglas 
burden shifting analysis.
1
  See Sheridan v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 
1061, 1065-66 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc).  Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff bears the 
initial burden of making out a prima facie case of discrimination.  If the plaintiff does so, 
the burden shifts to the defendant to state a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the 
                                              
1
 The same analysis applies to Greenawalt’s Title VII, ADEA, and PHRA claims.  See 
Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 
F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996).     
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employment action.  Once the defendant does so, the presumption of discriminatory 
action is rebutted and the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s stated reasons are a 
pretext for unlawful discrimination.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
802-04 (1973).   
 To make out a prima facie case, Greenawalt must show, among other things, that 
he suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances that give rise to an 
inference of unlawful discrimination.  See Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 
410-11 (3d Cir. 1999).  Those circumstances may include the more favorable treatment of 
similarly situated individuals outside of the plaintiff’s protected class.  Id.            
We agree with the District Court that Greenawalt did not meet his burden of 
making out a prima facie case of discrimination.  His proffered comparators are not 
similarly situated to him.  Although each of the corrections officers violated the same 
policy (Policy A-106) as he did, none of them covertly deposited money in a current 
inmate’s account at the jail.  The County was well within its discretion in treating 
Greenawalt’s case differently than those of his comparators.  If a current inmate can 
convince a corrections officer to send the inmate hundreds of dollars, the officer may be 
subject to the inmate’s direction in other ways.  In fact, according to Greenawalt, the 
female inmate told other inmates that she ―owned‖ him.  That is a security risk.  It was 
permissible for the County to believe that relationships with former inmates, though they 
violate the policy, are not nearly as egregious as Greenawalt’s behavior.   
 We also agree with the District Court that, assuming Greenawalt had established a 
prima facie case of age or gender discrimination, the County has given a legitimate, non-
6 
 
discriminatory reason for Greenawalt’s termination, and Greenawalt has failed to present 
evidence of pretext.  ―In order to show pretext, a plaintiff must submit evidence which (1) 
casts doubt upon the legitimate reason proffered by the employer such that a fact-finder 
could reasonably conclude that the reason was a fabrication; or (2) would allow the fact-
finder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative 
cause of the employee’s termination.‖  Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 
358, 370 (3d Cir. 2008).  As proof of pretext, Greenawalt again points to the more 
favorable treatment his comparators received.  But, as we noted, his comparators did not 
engage in similar conduct.  We agree with the District Court that the County’s 
―determination that Greenawalt committed a sufficiently egregious offense worthy of 
termination was such that a fact-finder could not reasonably infer that Greenawalt’s 
termination was a post hoc fabrication, or that Greenawalt’s age or gender motivated 
[the] decision.‖ 
 Greenawalt’s mixed-motive theory also fails.  To begin, a violation of the ADEA 
cannot be shown using a mixed-motive theory.  Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 
690-91 (3d Cir. 2009).  Under Title VII, a mixed-motive plaintiff may establish an 
unlawful employment practice by demonstrating ―that race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other 
factors also motivated the practice.‖  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).  The plaintiff is not 
required to present direct evidence of discrimination in order to proceed on a mixed-
motive theory under Title VII.  Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003).  
Circumstantial evidence of discrimination is sufficient.  Id. at 99-100.  As our discussion 
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above makes clear, Greenawalt presents no direct or circumstantial evidence that his 
gender was a motivating factor in his termination. 
 Finally, Greenawalt cannot proceed on a subordinate-bias, or ―cat’s paw,‖ theory 
of discrimination.  A plaintiff may proceed on this theory if he offers evidence that ―those 
exhibiting discriminatory animus influenced or participated in the decision to terminate‖ 
him.  Abramson v. William Patterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir. 2001).  
Greenawalt claims that the County relied on the Jail’s Warden to provide them with the 
facts on which they based their termination decision.  However, he has failed to point to 
any evidence that the Warden had discriminatory, bad intent toward him. 
*    *    *    *    * 
 For these reasons, we affirm the order of the District Court granting Clarion 
County summary judgment.  
 
